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Agent-Relative Consequentialism and Collective Self-Defeat1 
Matthew Hammerton, Singapore Management University 
mhammerton@smu.edu.sg 
 
Agent-Relative consequentialism has emerged in recent years as a serious option in 
normative ethics. Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that it should not be seen 
as such because it violates an overwhelmingly plausible principle they call ‘Non-
Compliance Is Never Preferable’.2 In this article I challenge their thesis by arguing for 
two claims. First, I show how, given certain assumptions, the problem they highlight is 
identical to Derek Parfit’s problem of direct collective self-defeat.3 Therefore, rather 
than being a new problem for agent-relative consequentialism, it may instead be an old 
problem faced by all agent-relative theories. Second, I show how Parfit’s suggested 
solution to his problem can be updated to apply to agent-relative consequentialism, and 
how this solution is plausible even when the problem is stated using Forcehimes and 
Semrau’s terms. The upshot is that ‘Non-Compliance is Never Preferable’ is not a 
serious threat to agent-relative consequentialism.   
 
                                                          
1 Please cite the published version, which is forthcoming in Utilitas (10.1017/s0953820820000096) 
2 Andrew T. Forcehimes and Luke Semrau, ‘Non-Compliance Shouldn’t Be Better’, Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 97 (2019), pp. 46-56. 
3 See Derek Parfit, ‘Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma’, Proceedings of the British 
Academy 65 (1979), pp. 539–64, and Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), pp. 95-110. 
 
Abstract: Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative 
consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as 
impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act 
is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit’s problem of 
‘direct collective self-defeat’ and show how Parfit’s plausible solution to his problem can 
be adapted to solve their problem. 
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1. The ‘Non-Compliance Is Never Preferable’ Problem 
Agent-relative consequentialism combines a consequentialist deontic principle (each 
agent must always perform the act that, of the acts available to her, results in the best 
consequences) with an agent-relative axiology (the correct evaluative rankings of states 
of affairs varies from agent to agent). Its agent-relative axiology allows it to 
accommodate deontic constraints. For example, consider a deontic constraint that 
prohibits killing an innocent person even if doing so is the only way to prevent more 
innocent people being killed by others. Agent-relative consequentialism can 
accommodate this constraint by holding that, for each agent, her killing an innocent 
person is worse-relative-to-her than other agents killing several innocent people. Let’s 
call agent-relative consequentialist theories that employ these kinds of axiological 
claims to accommodate the deontic constraints found in commonsense morality 
‘standard agent-relative consequentialism’. Advocates of standard agent-relative 
consequentialism often claim that it is an especially attractive moral theory because it 
combines the theoretical elegance of consequentialism with the intuitive deontic 
verdicts of deontology.  
Forcehimes and Semrau claim that these benefits come at a great cost. They 
suggest that the following principle is overwhelmingly plausible: 
Non-Compliance Is Never Preferable. A moral theory must not allow there to 
be any possible circumstance in which, were every agent to act impermissibly, 
each would have more reason (according to the theory) to prefer the world 
thereby actualized over the world that would have been actualized if every agent 
had instead acted permissibly.4 
They then argue that standard agent-relative consequentialism violates this principle. 
Their argument appeals to the following case: 
Thirst For Blood. Charlie and Debbie have a powerful desire to kill. Without 
intervention, each will freely kill three young children. Fortunately, Debbie 
possesses a drug. If she treats herself, then her killings will be reduced by one. 
If instead she treats Charlie, then his killings will be reduced by two. Charlie 
also possesses a drug. If he treats himself, then his killings will be reduced by 
                                                          
4 The wording closely follows Forcehimes and Semrau ‘Non-Compliance Shouldn’t Be Better’, p.51.  
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one. If instead he treats Debbie, then her killings will be reduced by two. Taken 
together, the drugs completely eliminate the desire to kill.5 
What ought Debbie and Charlie do in such circumstances? Should they treat themselves 
or treat each other? Forcehimes and Semrau point out that if we assume standard agent-
relative consequentialism then this case has a Prisoner Dilemma structure. According 
to standard agent-relative consequentialism, each agent is required to treat herself. 
Debbie is required to treat herself because, whatever Charlie does with his drug, treating 
herself will minimize the killings that she performs. Charlie is required to treat himself 
because, whatever Debbie does with her drug, treating himself will minimize the 
killings that he performs.6 However, if Debbie and Charlie obey this requirement and 
treat themselves then each will end up killing two innocent people. By contrast, if each 
violates this requirement and treats the other then each will end up killing only one 
innocent person. Yet, according to standard agent-relative consequentialism, that 
Debbie and Charlie each kill one innocent person is a better outcome relative to each 
of them than the outcome of each killing two innocent people. Thus, in Thirst For Blood 
standard agent-relative consequentialism requires agents to act a certain way even 
though it also tells them that a better outcome would result were none of them to act 
this way. In other words, it violates Non-Compliance Is Never Preferable.  Let’s call 
this the ‘non-compliance’ problem.  
2. The ‘Direct Collective Self-Defeat’ Problem 
Derek Parfit introduces a problem for agent-relative moral theories that he calls ‘direct 
collective self-defeat’.7 He understands all moral theories as giving agents certain 
substantive aims, which he calls ‘theory-given aims’. According to Parfit, a theory is 
directly collectively self-defeating if and only if when all of us successfully follow that 
theory, we thereby cause our theory-given aims to be worse achieved than they would 
have been if none of us had successfully followed that theory.8   
                                                          
5 Forcehimes and Semrau ‘Non-Compliance Shouldn’t Be Better’, p.53. 
6 See the table in Forcehimes and Semrau ‘Non-Compliance Shouldn’t Be Better’, p.53.  
7 See Parfit ‘Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma’, and Reasons and Persons, pp. 95-110.  
8 Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 53-54.  
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Parfit presents several cases where commonsense morality appears to be 
directly collectively self-defeating. For example, commonsense morality appears to 
give each parent the substantive aim that her children are not harmed. Yet in a case 
called the Parents Dilemma, two parents each have the options of either saving their 
own child from a lesser harm or saving the other’s child from a greater harm.9 The 
agent-relative requirement that each parent prevents her child being harmed results in 
this case having a Prisoner Dilemma structure. Each parent is required to protect her 
child from the lesser harm because, whatever the other parent does, this will result in 
less harm to her child. However, if both parents obey this requirement then their 
children are worse off than they would have been had each parent instead protected the 
other’s child from the greater harm. Hence, their theory-given aims are better achieved 
if both disobey the agent-relative requirement.   
3. Are They the Same Problem? 
One interesting feature of direct collective self-defeat and the non-compliance problem 
is that they appear to apply to exactly the same cases. Forcehimes and Semrau 
demonstrate the non-compliance problem with Thirst for Blood. However, Thirst for 
Blood is also an example of commonsense morality being directly collectively self-
defeating.10 The constraint on killing gives each agent a theory-given aim that she does 
not kill. In Thirst for Blood this constraint requires Debbie and Charlie to treat 
themselves. Yet Debbie and Charlie would better satisfy their theory-given aims if they 
instead treated each other. Similarly, Parfit’s Parents Dilemma is a case in which the 
non-compliance problem arises. Each parent is required to save her own child from the 
lesser harm. Yet, their children would fare better if they instead acted impermissibly 
and saved the other’s child from the greater harm. Thus, acting impermissibly is morally 
preferable. In this example, it is notable that a moral theory does not need to be a version 
of agent-relative consequentialism to face the non-compliance problem. It only needs 
to be an agent-relative theory holding that there are things agents are morally required 
to prefer. Therefore, just like direct collective self-defeat, the non-compliance problem 
appears to apply to agent-relative theories more generally. 
                                                          
9 Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 95-98. 
10 They appear to acknowledge this in Andrew T. Forcehimes and Luke Semrau Thinking Through 
Utilitarianism (Hackett, 2019), p. 71.   
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These similarities suggests that direct collective self-defeat and non-compliance 
is never preferable may actually be the same problem, stated using slightly different 
language. In fact, it is possible to produce statements of each of them that mirror one 
another: 
The Non-Compliance Problem: The moral theory entails that in certain 
circumstances, were every agent to act impermissibly, each would have more 
reason (according to the theory) to prefer the world thereby actualized over the 
world that would have been actualized if every agent had instead acted 
permissibly. 
Direct Collective Self-Defeat: The moral theory entails that in certain 
circumstances, were every agent to act impermissibly, each agent’s theory-
given aims would be better achieved then they would if every agent had instead 
acted permissibly.   
Each of these statements concerns a fundamental clash between what a theory requires 
individually of each agent and what best realizes the moral aims or moral preferences 
of all agents.  Whether they are in fact equivalent depends on whether the following 
biconditional is true: 
(1) An agent has more (moral) reason to prefer the actualization of W1 to W2 
if, and only if, the agent’s theory-given aims would be better achieved if W1 
rather than W2 is actualized. 
Many will find this biconditional plausible. Intuitively, if a moral theory says that an 
agent morally ought to prefer something, then it should also make that thing the agent’s 
substantive moral aim. Intuitively, if a moral theory gives an agent a particular 
substantive moral aim then it ought to require that agent to prefer the realization of that 
aim over its non-realization.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to find moral theories that reject (1). For example, 
some deontologists hold that it is morally wrong to kill one to save five, yet agree that 
killing one would bring about a morally better outcome. Such deontologists are often 
interpreted as saying that it is wrong to kill the one even though the outcome of this act 
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is morally preferable.11 Yet, according to Parfit’s account of how moral theories provide 
substantive aims, this deontological view gives agents the substantive aim that they do 
not kill. Therefore, we have a case where a moral theory gives an agent the substantive 
aim that she does not kill yet holds that she morally ought to prefer the outcome in 
which she does kill. Such a theory entails that there are cases in which a moral theory 
is directly collectively self-defeating, yet does not face the non-compliance problem.12 
Therefore, whether we should regard these problems as equivalent or distinct will 
depend on the theoretical commitments we endorse. However, even on views in which 
these two problems are technically distinct, there seems to be enough similarities 
between them to suggest that a solution to one will generally be applicable to the other. 
Parfit presents a solution to the problem of direct collective self-defeat.13 Yet 
Forechimes and Semrau do not anticipate any solutions to the non-compliance problem. 
Therefore, an obvious next step is to see whether Parfit’s solution also applies to the 
non-compliance problem.  
4. Parfit’s Solution 
Parfit’s solution makes two revisions to commonsense morality so that it no longer 
requires agents to act in ways that are self-defeating. Revision R1 concerns what agents 
ideally ought to do, whereas R2 concerns what agents are required to do when not 
everyone will do what they ideally ought to do:  
(R1) When obeying a rule in this theory is self-defeating, we should all ideally 
do what will cause the theory-given aims of each to be better achieved.  
(R2) When obeying a rule in this theory is self-defeating, each agent should do 
what we all ideally ought to do if at least k agents will do this.  
Parfit clarifies that R2 has two special features: (i) if k or more agents do what we 
ideally ought to do then each will better achieve their theory-given aims than they 
would have if no one did this. (ii) If less than k do what they ideally ought to do then 
                                                          
11 For example, see Casper Hare The Limits of Kindness (Oxford 2013), p.91.  
12 Theories that entail the converse are also possible, although they seem less plausible. For example, a 
theory that requires you to kill the one, yet says that you have most reason to prefer that you do not kill 
them.    
13 Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 100-110.  
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each will do worse at achieving their theory-given aims than they would have if no one 
had done this.14  
An agent-relative theory that incorporates R1 and R2 escapes the problem of 
direct collective self-defeat. For example, in the Parents Dilemma a theory containing 
these rules says that the parents ideally ought to save each other’s child from the greater 
harm rather than saving their own child from the lesser harm. It also says that each 
parent ought to do what he ideally ought to do if the other parent will do what she 
ideally ought to do.  Therefore, if I know that you will save my child from the greater 
harm then I ought to save your child from the greater harm.  
If non-compliance is the same problem as direct collective self-defeat, then 
Parfit’s solution equally applies to it. On the other hand, if they are distinct problems, 
we only need to slightly modify R1 and R2 for them to directly address the non-
compliance problem:   
(R1′) When obeying a rule in this theory violates Non-Compliance is Never 
Preferable, we should all ideally do what will cause each to better achieve what 
the theory holds to be preferable.   
(R2′) When obeying a rule in this theory violates Non-Compliance is Never 
Preferable, each agent should do what we all ideally ought to do if at least k 
agents will do this.  
A theory containing these principles requires agents to cooperate in the Parents 
Dilemma (and other similar cases) whenever it is the case that the other parent will also 
cooperate. The result is that all agents acting in a way that will bring about outcomes 
that ought to be preferred by all is no longer impermissible.   
Parfit claims that his principles, R1 and R2, can be added to any agent-relative 
theory. However, he does not consider agent-relative consequentialism, which was not 
properly developed as a theory at the time that he was writing.15 Yet R1 and R2 cannot 
                                                          
14 See Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 100-102. Parfit states these conditions in terms of the Parent’s 
Dilemma. I have rewritten them to apply to all cases of direct collective self-defeat. I have also left out 
a third revision (R3) that further elaborates on R2.  
15 Amartya Sen ‘Rights and Agency’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982), pp. 3–39 is widely 
regarded as the first presentation of agent-relative consequentialism, however, he sketches the view 
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be added to standard agent-relative consequentialism because consequentialism, by 
definition, contains only one moral requirement—to maximize the good—and cannot 
be supplemented with additional rules. What we can do is incorporate the idea behind 
R1 and R2 into standard agent-relative consequentialism by building this idea into the 
axiology. This, of course, is the standard move in the consequentializing programme. 
Ask consequentialists to accommodate a new rule into their theory and they will do so 
by adjusting their theory of the good so that, when agents maximize the good, they 
always end up complying with the rule. Here are two axiological principles related to 
R1 and R2 that do this: 
(A1) In circumstances like Thirst for Blood and Parents Dilemma where 
everyone complying with standard agent-relative consequentialism is worse 
relative to each agent then everyone not complying with it, the outcome in 
which all agents cooperate to bring about what is best relative to all is ranked 
higher on each agent’s relativized rankings than all outcomes where they do not 
cooperate.  
(A2) In circumstances where some agents do not cooperate to bring about what 
is best relative to all, the outcome in which you are one of at least k agents who 
cooperates is better-relative-to-you than all outcomes in which you are not one 
of at least k cooperating agents.16  
Any version of standard agent-relative consequentialism that includes A1 and A2 in its 
axiology will escape the direct collective self-defeat and non-compliance problems. 
Thus, Forcehimes and Semrau are wrong to claim that the problem they highlight 
undermines agent-relative consequentialism. They fail to recognize that a plausible 
agent-relative consequentialism will contain A1 and A2 and thereby avoid this problem.   
 
 
                                                          
very broadly. Parfit Reasons and Persons does not engage with Sen’s work and appears to assume that 
consequentialism is necessarily agent-neutral. 
16 Parfit’s two provisos for R2, suitably adjusted, obviously apply here.  
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3. Defending Parfit’s Solution 
I will finish by defending Parfit’s solution against one possible line of criticism.17 A 
critic might reject the use of principles like R1 and R2 or A1 and A2 on the grounds 
that they are ad hoc additions to a moral theory, carefully designed to account for just 
those cases in which the problem arises.  
I think that there are three promising lines of response to this complaint. First, 
it may be pointed out that making small revisions to an otherwise plausible moral theory 
in order to address a serious objection against that theory is a legitimate move to make 
and cannot be so quickly dismissed as ad hoc. Many agent-relative moral theories 
already generally favour adopting a diverse and complex range of deontic or axiological 
principles in order to account for commonsense morality. Therefore, adopting further 
such principles in this instance does not seem especially problematic.    
Second, Parfit suggests that there is a deeper justification for adopting his 
revisionary principles.18 He argues that a common mistake in our moral theorizing is to 
focus only on individual acts, neglecting the effects of sets of acts that we perform 
together (he calls this the ‘second mistake in moral mathematics’). He then argues that 
moral theories are directly collectively self-defeating in part because they make this 
mistake. Therefore, revisions like R1 and R2, or A1 and A2 are justified because they 
bring the consideration of action at the collective level to moral theories that have 
wrongfully ignored it. Correcting such a mistake in a moral theory is not an ad hoc 
move to make.19  
Finally, several commentators have argued that Parfit’s solution to the problem 
of direct collective self-defeat is unnecessary because commonsense morality already 
contains rules or assumptions that prevent cases of self-defeat from arising.20 If these 
                                                          
17 I am not aware of anyone who has raised this criticism in print. However, it seems to be a serious 
enough concern to deserve a response.  
18 Parfit Reasons and Persons, p. 108.  
19 This response will only appeal to those who are willing to accept Parfit’s ‘second mistake in moral 
mathematics’. It is not an entirely uncontroversial thesis and has been disputed by Frank Jackson 
‘Which Effects?’ Reading Parfit, ed. Johnathan Dancy (Oxford, 1997), pp. 42-53.     
20 See: Bart Gruzalski ‘Parfit’s Unified Theory of Morality’, Philosophical Studies 50 (1986), pp. 143-
152; Arthur Kuflik ‘A Defense of Common-Sense Morality’, Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 784-803; Lanning 
Sowden ‘Parfit on Self-Interest, Common-sense Morality and Consequentialism’, The Philosophical 
Quarterly 36 (1986), pp. 515-535; and Kieran Setiya ‘Parfit on Direct Self-Defeat’, The Philosophical 
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critics are correct then no revisionary principles are required and thus the concern that 
these principles are ad hoc does not even arise. This applies not only to R1 and R2 but 
also to A1 and A2. Standard agent-relative consequentialism builds the rules and 
assumptions of commonsense morality into its axiology. Therefore, if commonsense 
morality already avoids direct collective self-defeat then standard agent-relative 
consequentialism will avoid it as well and thus does not need to include special 
additional axiological principles like A1 and A2. 
In summary, a strong case has been made that the non-compliance problem is 
not a serious threat to agent-relative consequentialism. The problem appears to apply 
to agent-relative theories more generally, and may well be identical to the problem of 
direct collective self-defeat. Furthermore, Parfit’s solution to the latter problem can be 
adapted to apply to agent-relative consequentialism, and is no less convincing when it 
is adapted in this way.21   
                                                          
Quarterly 49 (1999), pp. 239-242. See also Derek Parfit ‘Comments’, Ethics 96 (1986), p. 851 for a 
significant concession to these critics.  
21 I am grateful to Ryan Cox, Sovan Patra, and two anonymous referees from this journal for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article.  
